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Speech act theory provides one of the crucial criteria for demonstrating that 
a play cannot be conceived as a text in the full sense of the word.1 'Play' is 
defined here as a set of printed verbal signs, organized as a script for a possible 
theatre production. 'Text' is defined here as a definite set of organized signs, 
verbal or otherwise, that the reader/spectator is confronted with and expected to 
decode. It can be shown, following speech act theory, that plays do not meet the 
conditions of this definition of 'text,' in particular because of the indefinite and 
non-final shape of the signs and utterances that the reader is expected to decode. 
In addition to sentences not being presented in the final medium—supposed 
to be voiced on stage—most of them do not indicate what kind of speech act they 
are part of. Only a naive reader might assume that all the speech acts of a 
dialogue are of a constative nature. In fact, the same sentence may be used for 
different speech acts, if accompanied by different gestures and intonations. 
Furthermore, even the so-called 'explicit' speech acts, with verbal indicators of 
force, can have their meaning easily changed by means of appropriate non-verbal 
indicators of force. Consequently, it can be said that non-verbal indicators of 
force are the most decisive and reliable factor in determining and recognizing the 
type of speech act a verbal sentence is part of. In other words, for any given 
play, there is no way to determine in the above sense, unless specified in stage 
directions, the nature of the component speech acts of its dialogue. Therefore, 
a play is always subject to interpretation, in the sense of assigning non-verbal 
indicators of force to the actual printed sentences of the dialogue; i.e., speech act 
theory leads to the conclusion that a play is an incomplete text since it does not 
comply with the truth conditions of 'text' as suggested above. Only a theatrical 
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performance presents the component speech acts of the dialogue in their definite 
and final form; i.e., it is not subject to interpretation on the utterance level in the 
sense of making force explicit Therefore, only a performance meets the 
conditions of the aforementioned definition of 'text.' 
At the same time, speech act theory also provides the criteria for 
demonstrating that our previous conclusion should not be taken as an absolute 
truth. Although most of the forces of speech acts are not verbally indicated by 
the speakers (the characters), plays usually provide other types of verbal clues, 
which substantially reduce the options of actors and directors when interpreting 
a play in the aforementioned sense of assigning force to speech acts. This claim 
supports our feeling, that at least in some kinds of plays, such as Shakespeare's 
tragedies, enough information is provided in order to make possible a 
quasi-'reading' of a play, as if it was a real text. Therefore, I intend to show that 
plays, or verbal scripts, although incomplete, are not as deprived as speech act 
theory might have led us to believe. 
Such a thesis does not contradict our previous claim, that a play cannot be 
conceived as a text in the full sense of the word. It certainly opens the way, 
however, for a more serious consideration of plays as primary sources of research 
than envisaged by theory in recent years. In this paper it is my intention to 
establish the basic ways of determining the nature of the speech behaviour of the 
characters and eventually provide a detailed example of this type of play analysis. 
Methodological Considerations 
There is a basic difference between the analysis of a speech act in the 
framework of play analysis and in the framework of performance analysis: in a 
performance speech acts are accompanied by non-verbal indicators of force and 
are delivered as definite instances of given types of acts. In contrast, in a play, 
not only non-verbal indicators of force are missing, but verbal indicators are 
usually missing as well. It is in this sense that plays are incomplete texts, since 
without specification of force, speech acts remain ambiguous, on a 'pre-text' 
status. Therefore, when 'reading' a play, whether for theatrical professional 
purposes or for the sake of analysis, the task of the reader is to interpret 
non-indicated acts, i.e., among other things to assign possible forces to speech 
acts which are coherent with all other components of the final text; i.e., within 
a given conception of the fictional world. 
On the other hand, categorization is the essence of verbal activity and it 
fulfils a crucial role in the description of the fictional world: 
First, there is a relationship of categorization between verbal expressions in 
the text and the referential fictional world described by it. In this respect it 
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should be emphasized that the real referent of verbal categorization is not stage 
reality but the fictional world evoked by the theatrical text; for example, 'stone' 
might be used for categorizing a lump of painted plaster and still be an adequate 
description for the fictional stone, if this lump is indeed meant to enact a fictional 
stone. 
Second, Speech Act Theory teaches that verbal categorization is found in 
speech acts in the form of self-referential categorization of force as an indicator 
of force, by using a performative verb that could have been used for the 
categorization of such a speech act; e.g., in 'I apologize for being late.' the verb 
'apologize' categorizes the force of the speech act, if it counts as an act of 
apology, since this verb usually categorizes acts of apology, whether it is part of 
the sentence or not, as in 'I am terribly sorry for being late.' However, as we 
shall see below, 'force' is not the sole aspect of the speech activity of the 
characters that can be categorized by linguistic means, and self-referential 
categorization is not the only possible type of categorization found in a play. 
There are other aspects of action and other characters, including functional ones, 
which play an important role in verbal categorization. All these additional types 
and aspects of categorization condition our way of reading and even interpreting 
a play. 
Since there is no difference between verbal categorization in a play and in 
a performance, there is no reason to discard verbal categorization of action found 
in plays for purposes of performance analysis: in both cases categorization applies 
to the fictional world and not to stage 'reality.' Furthermore, from this point of 
view the situation is reversed: a performance, as a primary source of speech act 
analysis, does not provide more information than found in the play. In this 
respect, the use of a performance as a primary source might even be 
counterproductive, since non-verbal indicators of force have to be categorized in 
terms of natural language before becoming objects of analysis, and such a 
translation might introduce categorization which is foreign to the text. In other 
words, plays, although incomplete texts, might offer a variety of types of verbal 
categorization, built into the very fabric of the dialogue, which are also organic 
elements of the final text. 
The main problem lies in that categorization by characters is subordinate to 
characterization and reflects biases in their comprehension of the fictional world, 
including their own predicament, while, on the other hand, categorization by 
functional characters depends on their particular function in the text. 
Consequently, the adequate use of verbal categorization found in dialogue 
depends on grasping the actual characterization and functions of the categorizing 
dramatis personae and, particularly, the ironic relations obtaining between them. 
If we detect the types of bias and degrees of ironic authority which these cases 
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of categorization reflect, we may rely on the verbal categorization found in a play 
as a real primary source of text analysis. 
In any case, as mentioned above, we would not find more verbal 
categorization in the performed play than is found already in the play itself; i.e., 
although the verbal script is an incomplete text, for the sake of verbal 
categorization it is the best primary source we have, and with an appropriate 
model of the fictional world and after due transformations, we might even find 
it an invaluable one. 
In the analysis of verbal categorization in theatrical texts I shall relate to the 
following: a) the aspects of action as potential objects of categorization; b) the 
types of dramatis personae that actually categorize speech activity, their functions 
and their degree of ironic authority. 
Verbal Categorization 
a. Aspects of action as objects of categorization 
I have suggested elsewhere2 that a speech act is a verbal index of an action;3 
as such a speech act is equivalent to a non-verbal act which is also an index of 
an action; therefore, speech acts and non-verbal acts can and should be analysed 
in terms of action theory.4 
Such an approach to speech acts affects our notion of 'dialogue' and 
changes it from an exchange of verbal descriptions to an exchange of indexes of 
actions, i.e., to a particular case of interaction. Since theatrical speech acts are 
iconic replicas of real ones, it follows that these basic features will be found in 
them as well. Furthermore, I have also tried to demonstrate that no speech acts 
but actions are the basic units of plot.5 
Current speech act theory deals with categorization of speech acts as if they 
were self contained entities. In contrast, the claim that a speech act is an index 
of an action entails that categorization might apply not only to the nature of acts 
but also to additional aspects of action; as van Dijk states: "An essential 
component in the definition of action turned out to be the various mental 
structures 'underlying' the actual doing and its consequences. This means that 
actions cannot as such be observed, identified or described. We have access to 
them only by the INTERPRETATION of doings. Such observable parts of acts, 
however, may be highly 'ambiguous'—We understand what somebody 'does' 
only if we are able to interpret a doing as a certain action. This implies that we 
reconstruct an assumed intention, purpose and possible further reasons of the 
agent."6 If so, categorization of force is not all; other aspects of action might and 
should be categorized as well. 
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Van Dijk distinguishes between two basic types of "mental structures" which 
underlie actual doings: "intentions" and "purposes." Apparently, "intentions" 
relate to the very essence of the act: in terms of current terminology, for example, 
a speech act of promise is successful, as far as intentions are concerned, when 
"the hearer knows that the speaker promises.71 suggest that such a view reflects 
a fallacy, which I term, the 'communication fallacy,' because it assumes that 
speech acts operate as a message to be decoded."8 In contrast, if a speech act is 
viewed as an act, equivalent to a non-verbal act, it is clear that if somebody 
makes a promise, indicated in the usual way, natural or conventional, it would 
certainly be categorized as a promise.9 Therefore, we should claim that a speech 
act is successful, if it is adequately categorized. In any case, speech acts 
presuppose intentions essentially connected with the act; for example, a promise 
indicates the intention to do something in the future that pleases the hearer. The 
assumption of an intention essentially connected to the nature of the act is 
legitimate, but it should be clear that such an intention is not communicated but 
fully indicated by the speech act itself. Speech acts also indicate that some 
conditions do obtain; for example, a promise implies sincerity, a commitment and 
an ability to do so.10 
Purposes, which reflect intended perlocutionary effects, are much more 
difficult to analyse. Purposes are not clearly indicated by the speech act itself, 
and in many a case they are intentionally kept veiled. Furthermore, purposes are 
not necessarily connected to particular speech acts. Purpose refers to the diffuse 
domain of possible effects that one can achieve by a particular act, verbal or 
otherwise. In principle, any possible perlocutionary effect can be correlated with 
any possible speech act. Consequently, categorization of purposes is open to 
speculation. However, speech acts do presuppose purposes and, even if not easy 
to categorize, they are nonetheless indicated by them. We might therefore find 
different categorizations of given purposes by various characters within one and 
the same text. 
It follows that there is an assumption of inner counterparts of speech 
acts—intentions and purposes—such as 'I promise.' Inner and outer counterparts 
constitute a whole, an action, of which the speech act is its perceptible side. 
Thus the referent of categorization might be the whole or its various components: 
its perceptible side or its intentions and purposes. In other words, verbal 
categorization may apply to intentions, such as 'promise,' 'order' and 'apologize,' 
to conditions, such as being committed, being sincere and being able, and to 
purposes, such as 'persuade,' 'insult' and 'undermine.' 
In principle, a promise counts as a promise regardless of intentions, purposes 
and conditions; but it counts as such because it presupposes the existence of 
intentions, purposes and conditions; i.e., categorization of acts is context free: a 
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promise is a promise regardless of intentions, purposes and conditions, although 
it presupposes them, regardless of success or failure on the intention or purpose 
levels, and regardless of characterization and situation. In contrast, categorization 
of given purposes is not context free, since they reflect characterization and 
motivation of given characters, i.e., categorization of purposes is dependent on 
the interpretation of speech acts. It is self-evident, however, that categorization 
on the act level is incomplete and that categorization on the action level is vital 
to the understanding of the plot, since characters react to the acts as indexes of 
actions. In other words, actions, and not speech acts, are the basic units of plot. 
The main problem in analysing speech acts resides in the fact that within the 
philosophy of language and pragmatics, speech acts are analysed as self contained 
phenomena. Such an approach cannot be maintained even for the analysis of 
actions, particularly in the context of drama, not only because the dual part-whole 
unity of act-action is part of a chain of actions, but mainly because the plot is 
prestructured according to the type of experience that the play is intended to 
impart to the audience; i.e., because the overall structure of the plot determines 
the ultimate meaning of its component actions. 
First, in the context of the structure of the plot we discern that 'immediate' 
purposes operate in the context of 'global' purposes11 or motives, such as 
marrying somebody, avenging something, or seizing power. Such global motives 
operate as major factors in the analysis of a single action. Furthermore, plot is 
conceived in terms of effects, i.e., in terms of the character having succeeded or 
failed not only in relation to his immediate purposes but mainly to his global 
ones; if a character wishes to marry someone, each of his actions, regardless of 
immediate purposes, is examined in relation to this global motive. Marriage 
might be a successful act regarding a person who desired marriage, for example, 
but Oedipus's marriage with his mother is regarded as a failure because of his 
desire to avoid it. We assume that every action of the character reflects such a 
global purpose. The decision to bring about success or failure of the global 
motives of the character utterly depends on the type of experience the audience 
is meant to undergo. Consequently, we expect that verbal categorization affects 
not only 'immediate' purposes, but also 'global' ones. 
Categorization of motives and actions may be exercised in matter of fact or 
'neutral' terms but, usually, action is characterized in terms of value systems. 
Value categorization is a crucial factor in the attitude of characters to other 
characters and to themselves. Moreover, value categorization is also a vital 
component of the structure of the plot since it determines the attitude of the 
audience to the characters, their motives, their actions and their final success or 
failure. Furthermore, value categorization affects the way in which motives, 
immediate or global, are grasped in the framework of the structure of the 
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character. For instance, the same act can be perceived as a tragic hamartia, if 
performed by a basically positive character, or as an act of evil, if the character 
is polluted by negative intentions. In other words, from the viewpoint of a value 
system, the structure of the character reflects a more complex type of 
intentionality (hamartia stricken characters, for example). this type of 
intentionality is in fact the basic constituent of the structure of the plot, since 
success or failure of global motives is also grasped by characters and audiences 
as harmonious or absurd in direct relation to the structure of the character on the 
value level. 
Consequently, categorization of intentions and purposes, neutral or value 
tinted, immediate or global, on the act or action levels, might be found in the 
verbal script. Furthermore, neutral categorization is implicit in value 
categorization, and should be analytically separated in the process of play or 
performance analysis. 
b. Types of categorization 
Categorization of acts, intentions and purposes appear in plays in three basic 
forms: 1) self-referential categorization by the speaker; 2) subsequent 
categorization of the action by the hearer or other characters following a speech 
act; 3) categorization by functional characters (theatrical conventions) which 
reflect the expected categorization by the audience from the viewpoint of the 
author. 
1) Categorization by the speaker: the use of a performative verb as an 
indicator of force is the basic method of self-referential categorization suggested 
already by speech act theory.12 In this case, we should say that the speaker uses 
a verb, that could have been used for categorizing the speech act, as an indicator 
of its force. I have suggested already that the so called 'explicit indicator of 
force' is not always a reliable categorization of a speech act, and that basically 
verbal indicators of force are subordinate to non-verbal ones, as in indirect speech 
acts; e.g., when 'I beg your pardon!' is not used for begging pardon, but for 
blaming.13 We may assume that a verbal indicator of force is reliable only on 
condition that it is not contradicted or modified by non-verbal indicators of force. 
I have suggested also that the use of performative verbs reflects an 
underlying convention which allows the use of such verbs, which usually 
categorize the force of speech acts, in a non-verbal capacity. However, the claim 
that performative verbs are used in a non-verbal capacity does not preclude such 
a verb from being used as a clue to the true nature of the speech act for which 
it is used.14 If plays are used as primary sources of analysis, the following 
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principle should thus apply: verbal indicators of force should be seen as 
conclusive, unless proven incompatible with possible non-verbal ones. 
We may also find self-referential categorization of intentions and purposes 
in the dialogue itself. In such a case, self-categorization might bear the stamp of 
a biased character. We may also find it in soliloquies, or equivalent conventions, 
in which characters reveal their innermost thoughts and feelings to the audience.15 
Since these conventions operate on the author-audience channel of 
communication, for the purpose of bestowing ironic superiority on the latter, such 
categorization may be unbiased. 
2) Categorization by the hearer: Categorization of a previous speech act is 
a necessary step before response by the hearer by means of a subsequent act, 
verbal or otherwise. In contrast to self-referential categorization of acts, which 
is basically an indexical activity—speech acts are objects of categorization and 
not part of the categorizing system—categorization by the hearer is a genuine 
verbal activity since it relates to speech acts as objects of categorization. 
Therefore, we might, and often do, find traces of it in dialogue; however, such 
categorization is not always made explicit, and quite often it is implicit in the 
very way that a character responds to a speech act; for instance, if a threat is 
followed by a counter threat, or if an order is followed by either obeying or 
questioning of authority, we may assume that adequate categorization has been 
accomplished. I suggest that whether this mediating verbal activity is made 
explicit or not, a model of verbal interaction should include it as a necessary 
component of its basic structure: 
speech act 
(stimulus) 
categorization —» speech act 
(response) 
Furthermore, since speech acts are indexes of actions, we may conjecture that this 
categorizing activity not only applies to the index, but also to the action as a 
whole, including intentions and purposes, since we assume that when the speaker 
acts, his intention is to produce an action and not only its perceptible side, and 
since, as mentioned before, when a hearer acts he reacts to the whole action and 
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We have claimed that speech acts are context free, whereas given purposes, 
although indicated by speech acts, are open to speculation. Nevertheless, we 
assume that categorization, true or false, precedes response and applies to acts, 
intentions and purposes. We may even conjecture that basically characters 
succeed in categorizing speech acts which are context free, whereas purposes 
might be mistaken since categorization too is dependent on characterization and 
its biases. 
3) Categorization by functional characters: Most of the theatrical 
conventions, such as chorus, confidant and ballad singer (Brecht), function on the 
indirect channel of communication between author and audience, which 
circumvents the characters of the fictional world. This channel of communication 
is used to enable the audience to understand the characters' world better than they 
do themselves; i.e., for the sake of irony.16 In other words, whereas categorization 
by the characters is usually biased, from an ironic point of view, categorization 
by means of these conventions enjoys authorial authority. Furthermore, it is 
because characters are biased that the indirect channel is needed. Such 
categorization aims at the actual target audience envisaged by the author 
(synchronic audience) and not at any random audience for whom the play is 
performed (diachronic audiences). 
As mentioned above, categorization of action can be neutral or value tinted. 
The value system which categorizes characters' behaviour may be shared by the 
characters of the fictional world and the audience, although this is not always the 
case. In many a play the value system is not shared even among the characters 
themselves. Therefore, the expected categorization by the audience is usually 
presented as part of the text in the mouth of functional characters, such as the 
chorus, the honest man or the prophet. Since the aim of the theatrical event is 
to bring about a given type of experience, it is obvious that categorization by the 
audience is the decisive factor in shaping this experience, and that categorization 
by characters, by means of any value system, is subordinate to the categorization 
made by the audience. Furthermore, there is a relationship of irony between 
them, in the sense of the audience's superiority in the understanding of the 
characters' world. Even if characters and audience shared the value system 
which underlies categorization, characters, tragic or comic, are usually afflicted 
by a structural bias in their point of view, which reflects their tragic or comic 
flaw; i.e., the ironic relationship is maintained in such a case as well. The 
expected categorization of the audience should thus be seen as the ultimate 
'truth.' This truth is of a ritual nature, since the fictional world is prestructured 
in order to substantiate it. 
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The stage directions found in plays are verbal categorizations of non-verbal 
aspects of the fictional world provided by the author. Therefore, stage directions, 
if they apply to aspects of speech acts, should be seen as reliable categorization, 
since they also enjoy authorial authority. 
An Example of Categorization of an Action 
After trying several times to hear from Teiresias what he knows about the death 
of Laius, in a short series of speech acts which range from suppliant requests 
("your suppliants" (327)) to blunt orders ("Tell us, you villain, tell us . . ."(335)), 
Oedipus suddenly accuses Teiresias of sharing the responsibility of Laius's death, 
save of the actual killing:17 
Oedipus: . . . I think you were a complotter of the deed and doer of 
the deed save in so far as for the actual killing. Had you had eyes I 
would have said alone you murdered him. (347-349) 
In this speech act there is no self-referential categorization of accusation. The 
accusation is made by simply stating facts in the manner of an assertive sentence. 
The question is, how did Oedipus arrive at such a strange conclusion? 
Seemingly there is nothing in Teiresias's recurrent refusals to speak, explicitly 
categorized by Oedipus as such (330), to make him suspicious. However, a 
closer examination reveals that Teiresias not only refuses to speak but clearly 
hints at some secret and incriminating knowledge, potentially devastating for both 
Oedipus and himself; for example: " . . . I will not / bring to the light of the day 
my troubles, mine—rather to call them yours" (328). It is safe to conclude that 
Oedipus sees in these hints a veiled accusation. If so, his own accusation of 
Teiresias becomes a counter accusation. 
However, an accusation in itself is not a sufficient condition for a sound 
counter accusation. Two facts are known: 1) Teiresias suggests that he knows 
the truth and refuses to speak, and 2) Teiresias hints at the possible guilt of both 
Oedipus and himself. Only if we assume that Oedipus was trying to conjecture 
Teiresias's purposes for such a veiled accusation, may we be able to understand 
the king's own accusation. The clue might be found in the fact that the encounter 
takes place in front of the people of Thebes, and that the veiled accusation might 
be aimed at discrediting the King in front of the crowd eager to find a scapegoat 
for their troubles. If we add to this assumption Oedipus's certainty that he is 
definitely not involved in the murder of Laius, an assumption made explicit by 
Oedipus in previous occasions, it follows that Teiresias knows who killed Laius 
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and that by hinting at the possible incrimination of the King himself he is not 
only shielding someone else but also trying to achieve something for himself. 
Such a reasoning, we may assume, must have taken place in Oedipus's mind 
before he made his accusation. 
Oedipus's conviction that he has nothing to do with the death of Laius is 
repeatedly stated and explicitly articulated in his proclamation: "I say as one that 
is a stranger to the story as stranger to the deed" (220). This feeling of 
noninvolvement with the story is expressed on various occasions by Oedipus 
before the speech act under scrutiny. Undoubtedly, there is an ironic dimension 
to the repeatedly expressed feeling of foreignness to the deed, since we assume 
that the audience were aware of at least the basic facts of the myth; otherwise, 
all the expressions, that are objects of irony, would have been pointless. 
However, this sense of irony, that was activated by the audience when trying to 
understand Oedipus's accusation of Teiresias, attests to the genuineness of 
Oedipus's feelings. 
Oedipus assumes also that whoever murdered Laius was motivated by the 
wish to seize power. If so, Oedipus has become the last obstacle in the 
murderer's way; or in his own words: "For when I drive pollution from the land/ 
I will not serve a distant friend's advantage,/ but act in my own interest. 
Whoever he was that killed the king may readily/ wish too dispatch me with his 
murderous hand;/ so helping the dead king I help myself (136-141). If so, such 
reasoning may lead to the conclusion that whoever now tries to strike at Oedipus 
will disclose his previous involvement in the crime against Laius. Oedipus is 
thus entitled to his excitement for having discovered the first substantial clue to 
the murderer of Laius. 
Furthermore, we may assume that in ordering all the citizens, including 
Teiresias, to tell the truth and in banishing anyone with knowledge of the killer 
who refuses to tell the truth, Oedipus is sincere in his promise to do whatever is 
in his power to find the killer. His global purpose is indeed to find the killer, to 
punish him, to restore peace to the land, and above all, to be a good king. Such 
a purpose is already lauded in advance by the people of Thebes. Ironically, 
Oedipus crowns it with success. 
Oedipus is motivated by a second and more crucial global purpose: to avoid 
his own fate. This purpose is also fully categorized in value terms within the 
play, although negatively in this case. During his search for his ancestry, 
Oedipus describes himself in terms which are meaningful within the framework 
of Greek religion: 
Oedipus: . . . But I account myself a child of Fortune, beneficent 
Fortune . . . (1080) 
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Oedipus relies on Fortune (the goddess Tyche) rather than on revealing Apollo. 
Such a feeling clearly contradicts the Greeks' belief in the oracles, and in Apollo 
himself. When Jocasta casts doubt on prophecy (851), the chorus harshly 
criticises her (865-910). This feeling of being foreign to the deed, (of so far I 
have managed not to fulfil the prophecy) with the religious implication of doubt 
on Apollo's power, must have been present in Oedipus's mind when making his 
accusation. 
Oedipus does not foreshadow that both global purposes are in any way 
related, or that finding the murderer of Laius might unveil that he has already 
fulfilled the prophecy. This is his blindness. 
Taking into account the nature of Teiresias's speech acts prior to Oedipus's 
accusation and the possible purposes of his veiled accusation, Oedipus's own 
purposes, immediate and global, and his own biased eyes, we may conjecture that 
the latter's reasoning would have been as follows: If he accuses me and I am 
undoubtedly innocent, he is trying to discredit me in front of my people for his 
own benefit. If he strikes at me in order to remove me from power, he is 
motivated by the same drive that brought about the death of Laius; i.e., he is 
guilty. Since being blind he could not have done the deed, he is definitely 
shielding somebody, *a friend'; therefore, in accordance with the terms of my 
own proclamation, he is the pollution of the land. Teiresias's accomplice, 
Oedipus suspects, is Creon (378). 
In other words, in order to understand Oedipus's accusation we must assume 
a train of thought, a conjecture of possible purposes of both characters, which is 
not fully indicated by the verbal text, but coherent with each and every verbal 
index found in it. 
Oedipus's accusation appears to be very well categorized by Teiresias, 
although not explicitly, since he responds with a counter accusation: 
Teiresias: Yes? Then I warn you faithfully to keep the letter of your 
proclamation and from this day to speak no word of greeting to these 
nor me; you are the land's pollution. (350-353) 
Teiresias's accusation is also not self-referentially categorized: he categorizes his 
first speech act as a warning (I warn you), and the second appears to be an 
assertion (you are the land's pollution). In fact, both are part of an indirect 
speech act of accusation. This accusation is made explicit a few lines later: 'I 
say you are the murderer of the king / whose murderer you seek.' (362) 
In the first speech act Teiresias categorizes Oedipus's former threat of 
banishment as a proclamation (more than 100 verses later!), which indeed it is: 
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Oedipus: I forbid that man, whoever he be, my land, my land where 
I hold sovereignty and throne; and forbid any to welcome him or cry 
him greeting or making him sharer in sacrifice or offering to the Gods, 
or give him water for his hands to wash. I command all to drive him 
from their homes, since he is our pollution . . . (235-242) 
Although Oedipus uses the performative verb "command" (self-referential 
categorization), this is indeed a proclamation of banishment. Whoever has any 
knowledge regarding the king's murderer should see himself as banished if he 
does not share his knowledge with the king, since he is the pollution of the land. 
In accordance with this proclamation, Teiresias, who ever knows the truth and 
does not share it, is the pollution of the land. 
Pollution, the Greek miasma, is a word heavily tinted with value overtones. 
Miasma means, among other things, that even a crime committed without 
criminal intentions, or unknowingly, must be still atoned for. If Oedipus has 
indeed killed his father, although he is not guilty in the legal sense, he is 
nonetheless both polluted and polluting the land. This is the pollution that the 
Gods wish to cleanse from Thebes as a condition to restoring its peace. Miasma 
by definition might function as a hamartia, setting the tragic action machine in 
motion; i.e., miasma is capable of making catastrophe commensurate with 
hamartia. Oedipus and Teiresias accuse each other of being the pollution of the 
land, although for different reasons, but Teiresias expresses the fictional 'truth.' 
Teiresias is a functional character, characterized as a very wise man who 
shares the knowledge of the Gods. Why does he not continue in his silence, but 
instead clearly provokes Oedipus into suspicion? The answer might well be that 
the gods have decided that the time has come for Oedipus to know the truth. 
This assumption is corroborated by the play's end. Furthermore, Teiresias's 
behaviour is also in line with Sophocles's possible intention to show Oedipus 
reacting to the truth as a blind man. Sophocles is interested in Oedipus's 
blindness, as the central metaphor of the play, since in his view, apparently, 
blindness is the quintessential feature of man. In fact, Sophocles contrasts on 
stage a double oximoron: Teiresias being blind and yet "seeing," and Oedipus 
seeing and yet being "blind" (370-373). Oedipus's blindness, in the scene under 
scrutiny, crystallizes the audience's feeling of ironic superiority that was 
generated during the previous scenes. As the plot evolves towards anagnorisis, 
i.e., to Oedipus sharing the knowledge of the audience and the gods, Oedipus's 
accusation of Teiresias certainly presents him at his nadir. 
Oedipus confronts Teiresias's words with his own wit (390-99). He 
demonstrates Teiresias's blindness by his failure to solve the riddle of the Sphinx, 
whereas Oedipus himself had no problem in doing so. Oedipus trusts his human 
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reasoning and in fact there would have been nothing wrong in so doing, had all 
the premises been known to him, such as having already fulfilled all the 
prophecies. 
Once irony has been well established, Teiresias can openly say whatever he 
wishes and Oedipus can not understand. Teiresias, in fact, as appropriate to a 
theatrical convention, is directly speaking to the audience. Oedipus no longer 
listens. Teiresias even describes the consequences of Oedipus's having married 
his own mother: "He shall be proven father and brother both/ to his own children 
in his house; to her/ that gave him birth, a son and a husband both;/ a fellow 
sower in his father's bed/ with the same father he murdered . . ." (457-9). The 
truth has become too blatantly absurd for Oedipus to listen to. 
In conclusion, it would appear that Teiresias's outburst is induced by 
Oedipus's irreverent behaviour, whereas in fact, he is fulfilling a structural 
function in the play. 
The analysis of the bit under scrutiny now shows a clear structure: the 
veiled accusation by Teiresias is followed by a straightforward accusation by 
Oedipus, first of Teiresias and subsequently of Creon, which is also followed by 
a straightforward counter accusation by Teiresias. In order to arrive at the 
sub-text of the play and the possible theatrical performance we assumed the 
existence of implicit aspects of action and implicit processes of assessing them. 
In order to do so, we made use of verbal categorization found not only in the bit 
itself, but throughout the play. In fact, we have been speculating on the way in 
which the characters themselves might have been speculating about other 
characters' intentions and purposes. I have presented here only one possible 
interpretation of this scene, but suggest that whatever the interpretation, it must 
proceed in a like manner. 
Conclusions 
Following the aforementioned considerations I suggests that a model for the 
analysis of categorization of particular actions in the context of plots and plot 
structures should include the following aspects: 
a) part-whole relationship act-action, including force, 
intentions, conditions, and purposes; 
b) context-free and context-dependent aspects of action, 
including immediate and global purposes; 
c) self-referential and referential (by the hearer) 
categorization, whether explicit or implicit; 
d) neutral and value categorization; 
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e) categorization as object or subject of dramatic irony; 
Finally, we should detect categorization that indicates the exact function of a 
particular speech act within the structure of the plot, in terms of success-failure, 
in terms of positive-negative value, and eventually in terms of harmony-absurdity 
in respect to the expectations of the audience. 
I suggest that traces of all these types of verbal categorization are to be 
found in the play, as their most natural location. Furthermore, we should not 
expect to find more verbal categorization in a performance than what is found 
already in the play. 
Should we conclude, in view of all these types of categorization, that a play 
determines unambiguously the nature of the described fictional world, in a way 
reminiscent of the known axiom which states that between two points only one 
line can be drawn? Could we conclude that after all a play is a text in the 
aforementioned sense of the word? The response in negative. Despite all its 
clues a play remains ambiguous and incomplete by any standard of 'text.' 
Complete, explicit and reliable categorization of every act and action of the 
fictional world is not to be found in any play. Plays cannot provide a full 
account of the complex network of intentionality interwoven in a fictional world. 
Unless we assume a sub-text, which explains all the phenomena on stage, the 
matter cannot be understood in its entirety. Obviously, even a theatrical text, i.e., 
a performance, cannot be understood without the audience assuming the existence 
of a sub-text and providing possible categorization where it is missing. However, 
one should not underestimate the scope of information found in a verbal text. A 
play provides a multitude of points, which restrict the number of possible lines 
that can be drawn among them; i.e., of possible interpretations. Obviously, plays 
written in different theatrical styles differ in this respect, but nevertheless, it has 
become evident that verbal texts contain more clues to their possible original 
sub-texts than envisaged by previous theory. 
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